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ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of inter-organisational network relationship is increasingly gaining currency in management 
research; however there is limited recognition as to how this relationship is governed. Governance is 
concerned with the structure, power and process to make decisions on collective activities. Making the right 
decision is an essential part of inter-organisational relationship governance. Decisions related to the inter-
organizational relationship governance can influence the health of the organizations and can as well result on 
fostering the success or greatly contributing to the failure of the organizations. We conduct an unsystematic 
review of the inter-organizational network relationship governance and related literature to offer insight into 
the governance mechanisms that are adopted in a transaction relationship by actors in a business ecosystem. A 
deeper understanding of inter-organizational governance will be valuable in crafting strategies for parties 
involve in transaction, as that can be used to predict behaviours of transactors as well influence the outcome of 
actors’ relationships. The study identified that appropriate blend or combination of different governance 
mechanisms is necessary, because the mechanisms exclusively do not exist mutually. 
 
Keywords: Business Ecosystem, Governance Mechanisms, Inter-organizational Relationship, Transaction 
Exchange Attributes. 
 
 
 
 
1.0: INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, inter-organisational network 
interactions have become a powerful tool in business; 
however, contemporary literature seldom appreciates 
how these relationships are appropriately governed. 
Von Tunzelmann (2003) explained governance to 
largely involve the structure, power and process to 
make decisions on collective activities(Von 
Tunzelmann, 2003). Making appropriate decisions is 
an essential part of inter-organisational relationship 
governance. Decisions related to the choice of inter-
organizational relationship governance can influence 
the health of the organizations and can as well result 
on fostering the success or greatly contributing to the 
failure of the organizations. Regarding mechanisms 
of governance, several authors have provided diverse 
conceptualizations in literature. This study takes a 
step to deepen the application and the understanding  
 
 
of inter-organisational governance concept. To 
accomplish these objectives, the paper tries to review 
related literature in an unsystematic fashion and to 
identify the diverse conceptualisation of governance 
mechanisms that exist in literature. It discusses the 
various forms and variations of governance 
mechanisms using the theories of transaction cost 
economics and the business ecosystem. 
 Section two discusses the concept and various 
perspectives of governance relationships. Section 
three discusses perspectives of business relationships 
and section four discusses the forms of governance 
mechanisms in business relationships. The 
implications, conclusions, possible limitations and 
suggestions for future research are presented in 
section 5.      
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2.0: CONCEPT AND PERSPECTIVE OF 
GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIP 
The concept governance does not offer itself to a 
precise definition or meaning, it is meant differently 
in different context. However, a comprehensive 
definition that is common to all forms of governance 
is that of monitoring and controlling relationships 
and behaviour of elements in a network or 
organization (Mannion et al., 2015; Provan & Kenis, 
2008) and in an attempt to improve coordination 
between the elements(Klijn, 2012). 
In corporate governance literature, it relates to the 
role of boards of directors in representing and 
safeguarding the stakes of the owners (shareholders). 
This is however, consistent with the principal versus-
agent problem, and is internal to the organization. In 
public management also, it relates to organizing 
public service effectively and efficient. In networks, 
governance is mostly seen as cooperation between 
independent actors in a web like fashion. However, 
in a network with a shared goal as in a business 
ecosystem perspective, it relates to efficiently and 
effectively organizing collective action to ensure a 
shared goal is attained(Klijn, 2012).  
2.1. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is typically concerned with the 
structures and systems of control by which managers 
are held accountable to those who have a legitimate 
stake in the organization(Johnson, Scholes, & 
Whittington, 2008). It is additionally characterized as 
the monetary and legitimate system for controlling 
the connection between an organization's 
administration and its investors (Eun, Resnick, & 
Sabherwal, 2012; Ramaremisa, 2014). It is internal to 
the organization and finds practice in organizations 
where the shareholders are not the managers. It 
becomes most important when many different 
shareholders exist with small blocks of shares. This 
is particularly the case with stock market exchanged 
shares which creates diffused shareholders. The 
efficiency of risk sharing with a multitude of 
shareholders has its downside in the possibility of 
conflict of interest between owners of the business 
(shareholders) and their managers. This is otherwise 
the agency problem. The information gap between 
managers and shareholders creates a tension that 
needs to be addressed. Managers have their own 
agenda in pursuing a career that might not be in the 
best of interest of the shareholder. This can be 
noticed in excessive wages, or investments in other 
companies to serve their private interests. It could be 
prevented if it would be possible to write a contract 
that would specify exactly what a manager should do. 
However, in practice this is impossible and managers 
are given the right to make appropriate decisions 
within a mandate. The mandate is part of the 
financial and legal framework and with different 
remedies, or mechanisms, the agency problem is 
governed. Next to the mechanisms, that are available 
to shareholders, national law protects the 
shareholders.  
Various governance mechanisms exist to control the 
agency problem. Most prominent is a board that 
comprise directors, and their fundamental role is to 
represent the interests of shareholders. If the board 
remains independent of the management team, it can 
serve as an effective mechanism (Eun et al., 2012; 
Ramaremisa, 2014). However, in a diffused 
ownership structure of a public company, managers 
most often select the board of directors, leading to 
poor governance results. Other mechanisms are, for 
example, incentive contracts or stock listings in 
countries that have protection by law that is more to 
the benefit of the shareholder. 
2.2. Public Management Governance 
  According to Klijn (2012),  public management 
governance relates to the fair treatment of citizens 
and organizations that adheres to the fundamental 
principles of the rules of the law. Here the focus is on 
the operation of government, rather than how the 
institution is organized. The principal mandate of 
public organization is to offer public service. In this 
view the role of the government is to provide public 
service and to govern these activities in a 
bureaucracy. Decisions regarding policy making and 
implementations are integrated vertically within the 
government. Hierarchical governance mechanism 
becomes a major tool in governance, with the focus 
on line managers and their accountability for 
spending public money (Osborne, 2010).   
However, in the 90s, a new dimension of public 
Management was identified , where it focussed on 
goal setting and encouraging other (public) 
organizations to provide public service rather than 
providing the services (Klijn, 2012). Thus the focus 
of the new dimension has shifted from 
implementation towards goal setting. Hill and Lynn 
(2004) made a contribution and suggest that, 
government activities should be contracted to public 
or private institutions to provide public services. Also, 
Osborne (2010) is of the view that market 
mechanisms can create the efficient provision of 
activities and on the basis of competitive pricing. The 
value drawn in this idea is contained within the 
notion that the market place is the most appropriate 
place for the production of public services. The 
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critical issue therefore, is the ability to control the 
output using explicit and unambiguous performance 
indicators as against of the process. The mechanisms 
of governance in this case are the engagement of 
clear contracts such as public-private partnerships 
and the evaluation of in-and output by performance 
management and auditing. 
2.3. Relationship Governance 
Relationship governance is concern with analysing a 
governance structure of the business relationship 
between a customer and supplier. The relationship is 
greatly focussed on the dyadic inter-organizational 
relationships that organizations are engaged into. The 
key mechanisms employed for governance are 
hierarchies, markets and trust (social mechanism) 
(Kohtamäki, Vesalainen, Henneberg, Naudé, & 
Ventresca, 2012). The appropriate blend of these 
mechanisms in governance offers the supplier or 
customer the opportunity to predict the behaviour of 
the other party engage in the transaction relationship 
(Adler, 2001). Governance in inter-organisational 
relationships is different from governance in 
corporate organisations as it relates to external 
organizations, and is different from public 
management governance as it addresses the 
relationships from a dyadic level of analysis.  
Relationship governance is in particular useful for 
analysing the relationships and identifying the 
mechanisms that are used. It can be used to develop 
strategies to predict behaviour and can help 
organizations optimize the value they extract from 
relationships. However, as it only analyses the dyadic 
relationships, it lacks notion of the environment. In 
particular the environment of an organization 
determines what partners to select and how to 
proceed in the relationship as new information can 
change the decision heuristics of the people involved.
  
3.0. PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS 
RELATIONSHIPS  
In making efforts to unravel the complexities of 
economic reality, different perspectives on 
relationships between companies, industries, and 
industry crossing networks have been developed. 
Some of the perspectives identified in literature and 
are employed to enrich the concept of governance are 
discussed below.  
3.1. Dyadic Relationship 
 Research on dyadic relationships is focused on “the 
characteristics and attributes of organizations to 
explain their relationship with other organizations” 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). The involvement with other 
organizations is through different types of dyadic 
relationships such as joint ventures, alliances, and 
partnerships. It is used to understand the nature of the 
relationship between organizations in terms of their 
characteristics and attributes (G Ahuja; Bellamy & 
Basole, 2013; Provan & Kenis, 2008). These 
characteristics incorporate, among others, tie strength, 
or trust level, and how these relational characteristics 
affect the likelihood of the relationship’s renewal, 
continuation, dissolution, or other outcomes (Gautam 
Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012).   
Some scholars such as Gulati (1999) and Gulati, 
Nohria, and Zaheer (2000)  have argued that when 
organizations repeatedly engage into ties with each 
other, the trust level between these two organizations 
improves. Uzzi (1997)  further added that, the 
strength of   relationship tie helps to foster specific 
types of asset sharing, and that strong ties are 
appropriate for the transfer of tacit knowledge, and 
weak ties foster the transfer of explicit 
knowledge .Furthermore,  ties that have embedded 
(social) relationships between managers of distinct 
organizations are said to improve firm performance 
(Ingram & Roberts, 2000). However, “over-
embeddedness can hurt performance due to the 
limited diversity of information to which they have 
access” (Gautam Ahuja et al., 2012). Regarding  trust, 
Zaheer and Kamal (2011)  have shown that high  
trust levels between organizations can lower 
transaction costs and “allow for the extraction of 
higher benefits from the relationship” .  
In summary, the dyadic perspective of relationship 
gives a view on the impact of a relationship between 
organizations but with an assumption of holding 
other factors constant.  It ignores the influence that 
the overall set of industry and network relationships 
have on organizations and the relationship between 
other organizations (Provan & Kenis, 2008). As a 
result, a network that is researched from a dyadic 
perspective consists of a collection of two-party 
relationships, rather than a unique, multi-
organizational social structure (Provan & Kenis, 
2008).  
3.2. Ego-Network Relationship 
The ego network relationship refers to the kind of 
relationship effects that an ego’s network has on the 
behaviour and performance of an organization. The 
perspective of this relationship is different and 
typically focused on the structure of relationships 
surrounding the focal organization (ego). The ego 
network relationship can be helpful in analysing the 
impact of individual organizations,  dyadic or 
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network ties, on organizational performance as well 
as focussed on the role of an individual organization 
in a network (Gautam Ahuja et al., 2012; Provan & 
Kenis, 2008).  Critical dimensions in this relationship 
perspective is concerned with the understanding of 
the structure of relationships with structural 
dimension such as: centrality, structural holes (and 
closure), structural embeddedness, structural 
equivalence, social capital and lastly status (Gautam 
Ahuja et al., 2012). 
In the past decades, the interest of research scholars 
was largely on dimensions such as centrality and the 
size of the alliance network of an ego network. 
Scholars have associated the structural dimensions to 
different meanings of organizational performance. 
For instance , (George, Zahra, Wheatley, & Khan, 
2001; Wassmer, 2010)  indicate that structural 
dimensions improves absorptive capacity, whereas 
the study of Deeds and Hill (1996) and Rothaermel 
and Deeds (2004) reveal improvement in the rate of 
new product development, and Improvement in the 
innovative output (Gautam Ahuja, 2000; Gautam 
Ahuja et al., 2012).  
Social capital is another domain of interest to 
research scholar. Burt (2009),studies reveal that,   
networks with many structural holes are rich in social 
capital ,whereas Coleman (1988) has a differing 
opinion and argued in favour of closure to improve 
social capital. In reconciling these conflicting views, 
Burt (2009) makes a distinction for different 
situations in which either structural holes or closure 
improve social capital. He indicated that closure in 
network favours social capital in situations of 
cooperation between organizations involved, whereas 
in situations where there is fierce competition 
between or among the organizations, structural holes 
will improve social capital.   
A last field of interest is ‘status’, which signals 
quality and aids in finding partners for exploring new 
domains (Dimov & Milanov, 2010).  A higher status 
compared to competitors can lead to lower 
transaction costs in acquiring resources (Podolny & 
Page, 1998).   
In literature ,studies on network are largely classed 
into micro and macro level of analysis  (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). That is the view from the individual 
organization with regard to its network, and the 
overall view from the network level. 
Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai (2005) also made a 
distinction between egocentric network and whole 
network respectively. However, a major limitation of 
this perspective is its central attention on a single 
industry, thereby making research findings to be 
generalized.  
3.3. Whole Network Relationship 
 Another perspective of relationship is the whole 
network relationship. It is concerned with the 
characteristics and behaviour of the entire inter-
organizational network (Gautam Ahuja et al., 2012). 
The whole network relationship is involved in 
analysing the effect of multi-level actions and 
structures on network level outcomes or a system-
level approach(Provan & Kenis, 2008).Structural 
concepts such as centralization and “small worldness” 
are key issues, together with the analysis at the whole 
network level instead of the individual level(Gautam 
Ahuja et al., 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008). In recent 
times attempts are made to unravel network 
dynamics (Gautam Ahuja et al., 2012). For instance, 
a study by  Lee and Venkataraman (2006) 
demonstrate the evolving of networks with 
characteristics on both at micro and macro level of 
analysis. The authors suggest that research is 
required to helps understand the dynamics of 
competition and cooperation in a network. Their 
work was supported by the work of W. W. Powell, 
White, Koput, and Owen-Smith (2005) where 
demonstrated how network evolves. They indicated 
that an actor can change from collaborator to 
competitor over time, that is to say collaborations are 
often cross-cutting. 
Other scholars argue to perform research into 
‘network dynamics’, in a broader sense. They argue 
that without knowledge of the genesis and evolution 
of the network structures, the outcome of the network 
is incomplete and potentially flawed. They develop a 
framework for research into network dynamics to 
help understand “how and why organizational 
networks emerge, evolve, and change”. They define 
the subject area and identify key dimensions on 
which networks can change (Gautam Ahuja et al., 
2012).  
 In summary, the whole network perspective focuses 
on a single industry, thereby making findings to be 
limited in generalizing. The perspective also lacks 
the understanding of network dynamics. According 
to Gautam Ahuja et al. (2012) in most network 
analyses, researchers face practical difficulties in 
obtaining longitudinal network data. 
3.4. Business Ecosystems Relationship 
 
In a study by Anggraeni, Den Hartigh, and Zegveld 
(2007) they indicated that the principal focus of 
research in business ecosystems is on relationships, 
interactions, and dynamics at the system level . A  
perspective that is trying to understand “the 
relationships or interactions among the members and 
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their environment, the roles and interests of the 
members of the system, and the mechanisms guiding 
these interactions toward the achievement of a shared 
goal” (Anggraeni et al., 2007).  They added that the 
view on business networks, the relationships and 
mechanisms shape the business ecosystem. It 
incorporates both an ego-network approach, with the 
roles and strategies of the individual actors, as well 
as a whole network approach, how the network 
coevolves towards a shared goal. This shared goal is 
seen as the forward-looking vision of the industry 
leaders (Moore, 2006).  
According to Moore (2006) the key issues are in the 
understanding of the complex inter-firm relationships 
between actors as well as the keystone species that 
has a strong influence on the coevolving dynamics in 
the business network. Scholarly research studies have 
largely focussed on the characteristics and roles of 
firms, and the structure and dynamics of networks. 
The dynamics in the network influence the 
governance choice and performance of actors in the 
system (Anggraeni et al., 2007). It creates a mutual 
dependence among each other in which multi-sided 
market effects can be identified (Eisenmann, Parker, 
& Van Alstyne, 2006).The dependency upon each 
other makes them more willing to cooperate as they 
can meet again in the future.  
The  distinction between dyads, whole networks and 
business ecosystems are the key issues central to trust 
and evolution that can be identified and may be 
unique to a particular level of network analysis 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). Moore suggested that, the 
system is more than a network, because it 
incorporates governmental bodies, associations, 
standardization bodies, and crosses different 
industries and networks (Moore, 1993).That is, the 
concept incorporates both relational embeddedness 
(as concept from the dyadic level) and structural 
embeddedness (as concept from the ego-network 
level). The perspective has the ability to open the 
black box of the co-evolution of outcomes, 
behaviours, and structures (Moore, 2006).  
Traditionally, firms were defined by their products 
and service offering. The focus was incorporating 
incremental innovations to existing products. 
However, in the ecosystem companies are defined by 
their innovation trajectory instead of their products 
and service offering. To be competitive, every 
company is forced to constantly update it products 
and services. The mutual dependence of companies 
allows them to co-evolve with other players in the 
ecosystem. They  aggressively look  for new 
possibilities and solutions in a more radical way to 
keep a competitive edge over other players in the 
ecosystem(Moore, 2006).  
 
4.0. PERSPECTIVES OF GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS IN BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS 
 
Regarding mechanisms of governance, literature 
provides diverse conceptualisations that are subject 
to debate by several authors. This section basically 
identifies what governance mechanisms exist in 
literature. It discusses the various forms and 
variations of governance mechanisms and how they 
are applied in business ecosystems. To achieve this, a 
step is taken to justify the basis for the study. 
 Governing a network is an interesting issue 
considering that  a firm can only influence the 
network to a certain extent, and couple with the fact 
that a lot also depends on the behaviour of other 
actors in the network (Anggraeni et al., 2007).   
Research scholars have indicated that the research on 
business ecosystem governance has seldomly 
received attention in both the academia and in 
practice, despite its relative importance (Jones, 
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Provan & Kenis, 2008).  
Jones et al. (1997) appreciate the increasing 
importance of network governance but quick to 
indicate that it is poorly understood.                  
Moore, the pioneer of business ecosystem  idea says 
that the most vital contracts governing  networks 
relationships are community governance systems and 
quasi-democratic mechanisms . Moore's idea on 
ecosystem system governance includes markets and 
hierarchies. He specifies that the ecosystem disguises 
the frameworks of firms and the markets that 
associate them under the directing hands of 
community leaders (Moore, 2006).        Iansiti and 
Levien (2004) Help to expand the comprehension of 
the business ecosystem idea, and specify that 
ecosystems are governed by shared destiny or fate. 
They don't, be that as it may, talk about these guiding 
mechanisms components in depth  .In a research 
work by Kohtamäki et al. (2012) they recognized 
diverse perspectives in network governance studies , 
which are: 
 Markets versus hierarchies, a view based on 
the transaction cost theory which defines 
price and authority as the mechanisms of 
governance.  
  Networks as an intermediate form between 
markets and hierarchies. In this 
interpretation, partnership is a more 
integrated form than a market but less 
integrated than a hierarchy.  
  Networks as a form distinct from markets 
and hierarchies. In this view the governance 
mechanism of a network is a social one, 
Volume 5| Issue 2 | June-August-2017 [(5)2: 239-253] | http://onlinejournal.org.uk/index.php/cajast/index  
emphasizing the meaning of shared purpose 
and trust between actors.   
  The simultaneous use of three different 
mechanisms of governance which are price, 
authority and social governance.   
 Vos (2006) as in    Anggraeni et al. (2007) identified 
four basic principles, coming from complex adaptive 
systems theory that can be used to conceptualize 
governance mechanisms, namely co-evolution, 
emergence, self-organization, and adaptation.  
4.1. THEORY OF TRANSACTION COST 
ECONOMICS  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a starting point 
for academic debate on governance, and 
distinguishes market governance (i.e., price 
mechanisms) and hierarchy governance (i.e., 
authority mechanisms)(Hennart, 1993; O. E. 
Williamson, 1979).The transaction cost economics 
principle has been introduced by Coarse in 1937 but 
has become widely known by (O. E. Williamson, 
1979)  by defining the cost of transactions in making 
or buying a product. If the costs of producing in-
house are higher than the market, a buy decision is 
made and if producing in-house is cheaper than the 
market a make decision is made. The market or 
hierarchy mechanisms of production are the two 
primary dimensions of TCE. Market governance 
mechanisms are used when the activities are 
organized external to the firm and hierarchy 
governance mechanisms are used when the activities 
are organized internal to the firm(O. E. Williamson, 
1979). Legal contracts and prices are the 
coordinating mechanisms in market governance, 
whereas employment contracts and authority are the 
coordinating mechanisms in hierarchy governance(de 
Reuver & Bouwman, 2012).  According to  O. 
Williamson (2005) the organizations within TCE are 
assumed to be rationally bounded, risk neutral, and at 
least some are opportunistic to allow for competition.  
Since its conception, TCE has elicited a great deal of 
criticisms, especially in social science literature. The 
notable one is that, TCE treats transactions as 
discrete events and omits the effect of social 
relationships on economic behaviour(Jones et al., 
1997) .For example, scholars have argued to consider 
self-enforcement arrangements, such as goodwill, 
trust and embeddedness (Dyer Jeffrey H., 1998). 
Such effects may stem from structural 
embeddedness(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) and 
relational embeddedness(Gulati et al., 2000). While 
Hennart (1993) proposes a continuum ranging from 
markets to hierarchies to solve these discrepancies.  
However, these dimensions have also been subject of 
criticism, indicating that they are mutually exclusive 
in their original form. It has led to additions of a 
‘network’ dimension as hybrid form, which is in 
between markets and hierarchies (O. Williamson, 
2005). Other scholars also argue that such a 
continuum fails to capture the complex reality of 
economic exchange. They advanced a third 
governance structure that involves exchange through 
networks of interdependent actors(W. W. Powell & 
DiMaggio, 2012; Sako, 2006). In this third structure, 
trust is the dominant mechanism, which conceptually 
is distinct from contracts and power.  
 The mechanisms of governance may mostly cover 
and the interchange of governance mechanisms is a 
central issue for some research scholars. They 
contend that in actuality plural types of governance 
happen, and that, actors can utilize numerous 
mechanisms in the meantime in light of the fact that 
the mechanisms are non-fundamentally unrelated. 
The exact confirmation demonstrated is that, in all 
actuality the mechanisms that are utilized as a part of 
the dimensions exist together and are utilized by each 
other(De Reuver, 2009; de Reuver & Bouwman, 
2012; McEvily, Zaheer, & Kamal, 2017; Von 
Tunzelmann, 2003).  For instance, authority 
mechanisms frequently exist in written contracts, or 
are implicitly present within an industry or network. 
4.2 TRANSACTION EXCHANGE CONDITIONS 
AND THE CHOICE OF    GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS   
4.2.1. Transaction Exchange Conditions of 
Resources 
 
 Exchange conditions of transactions raise transaction 
costs and can create market failure(Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006) . Leading to the 
decision to produce internal to the firm or integrate 
vertically. These conditions are; ‘asset specificity’, 
‘uncertainty’, and ‘transaction frequency’(O. E. 
Williamson, 1979). They are the conditions or 
attributes surrounding the transaction in the 
dimensions of markets and hierarchies and are the 
observable measures as identified by(O. Williamson, 
2005) . In a study conducted by Jones et al. (1997) 
they confirmed that exchange conditions of the 
network dimension are similar but have the additions 
of ‘task complexity’ and are more specific to the 
situation in which the network form will emerge and 
thrive. The different common conditions are 
described.  
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4.2.1.1 Asset Specificity  
 
Asset specificity refers to the level of unique 
investment required to support a transaction.  It 
allows dependency between partners(Jones et al., 
1997). Exchanges   can range from non-specific to 
highly specific, and the asset specificity level 
influences governance choice(O. E. Williamson, 
1981, 1991). A high asset specificity level of a 
transaction entails customized exchanges or assets to 
the transaction. Transaction exchanges supported by 
non-specific assets do not pose significant exchange 
hazards because the assets can easily be redeployed 
without greater loss of value. Such assets can be 
more easily redeployed than highly specific assets 
because alternate partners interested in the 
transaction of the asset can be identified and 
therefore reduce the threat of opportunism (Mahoney 
& Pandian, 1992). According to TCT, when the 
threat of opportunism is low, there is much less need 
for formal controls or dispute resolution mechanisms 
and therefore, markets and relational (Trust) forms of 
governance  are preferred to the hierarchical form of 
governance(O. Williamson, 2005).However, when a 
high level of unique investments is made it cannot be 
easily redeployed to other uses, and if transactors’ try 
to redeploy the assets they incur increased 
transaction cost. With this, there is a safeguarding 
limitation as market competition will exploit the 
assets opportunistically to increase the transaction 
costs. The authority relationships and hierarchical 
control procedures through vertical integration are 
assumed to have greater safeguarding capabilities 
and are seen as the solution to the problem(Geyskens 
et al., 2006).   
4.2.1.2. Uncertainty 
 
A second transaction exchange condition is  
uncertainty which arises when project properties are 
too unpredictable to be specified beforehand in a 
contract or the performance cannot be verified 
afterwards(Geyskens et al., 2006). It is broken up 
into environmental uncertainty and behavioural 
uncertainty.  Environmental uncertainty refers to 
unpredictability outside the firm’s boundaries(O. 
Williamson, 2005; O. E. Williamson, 1991).   When 
environmental uncertainty is low, there are much less 
unanticipated disturbances. Transaction costs are low 
because firms can anticipate and specify ex ante 
appropriate adaptations to disturbances in market and 
hybrid contracts(O. E. Williamson, 1991).When 
environmental uncertainty is high, however, 
boundedly rational economic actors cannot anticipate 
environmental disturbances to specify all appropriate 
contractual adaptations.  The environmental changes 
that require adaptations to an agreement raise 
transaction costs and can be solved by hierarchical 
mechanisms of a contract or authority. Thus, the 
higher the environmental uncertainty, the greater the 
likelihood that contracts will be incomplete.  When 
contracts are incomplete, the threat of opportunism 
and transaction costs increase because adaptations 
are needed in response to environmental 
disturbances(O. Williamson, 2005; O. E. Williamson, 
1991).  Increased environmental uncertainty confuses 
managers’ abilities to predict contingencies, which 
makes contracts more incomplete. When contracts 
are more incomplete, higher transaction costs arise 
because bargaining and renegotiations are needed to 
resolve disputes arising from unforeseen 
contingencies.  
  The behavioural uncertainty surrounding a 
transaction involves the difficulties in evaluating if 
the performance measured ex post meets the 
expectations. The classical argument from TCE 
would be to integrate the activities vertically in such 
a situation, a make decision is then made. This will 
allow the firm to remain in control over these 
activities and acquire more complete information for 
the ex post evaluation(Geyskens et al., 2006).  
 Compared to hierarchies, markets and hybrids have 
less powerful ways to resolve disputes.  Hierarchies 
can resolve disputes more efficiently via fiat, which 
reduces transaction costs and improves 
adaptability(O. Williamson, 2005; O. E. Williamson, 
1991). Markets, on the other hand, rarely specify 
dispute resolution mechanisms and although hybrid 
contracts may include such mechanisms, they are less 
efficient than fiat. Thus, as environmental uncertainty 
increases, hierarchy lowers transaction costs and 
better enables firms to navigate their environments.  
4.2.1.3. Frequency of Transaction 
 
 A third condition is the frequency of transaction. 
Transaction frequency refers to the number of times a 
transaction occurs. According to(O. Williamson, 
2005; O. E. Williamson, 1991) , transaction 
frequency can be categorized as one-time, occasional, 
or recurring. When frequency is one-time or 
occasional, transaction costs and adaptation problems 
are often low because these transactions pose fewer 
threats of opportunism. In short, contracts can be 
more easily written when transactions are one-time 
or occasional. If a transaction is to transpire for one 
week, for instance, transactors could more easily 
anticipate and specify contractual contingencies. 
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Accordingly, firms’ adaptation capabilities are not 
heavily influenced. Thus, non-recurring transactions 
have fewer threats of opportunism, and have a lesser 
impact on transaction costs or adaptability. Because 
markets preserve more powerful incentives than 
hierarchy and such transactions have little impact on 
firms, they are consequently handled by markets 
(Atalay, Hortaçsu, & Syverson, 2014; Brodrechtova, 
2015; Globerman & Schwindt, 1986; Hashimoto, 
2017; Vinholis, Filho, Carrer, & Chaddad, 2014) .   
When transactions recur, however, hierarchy can 
lower transaction costs(Tadelis & Williamson, 
2012).Masters and Miles (2002)for example, found 
that because of costs resulting from negotiating and 
renegotiating contracts for recurring needs, market 
contracting increases transaction costs. Firms 
preferred hierarchy instead because contracts do not 
need to be negotiated or renegotiated on an ongoing 
basis, thereby reducing transaction costs.  Hierarchies 
therefore lower transaction costs by ameliorating 
ongoing negotiating and renegotiating costs with 
other transactors. Furthermore, an increased 
transaction frequency will reduce the information 
asymmetry between the organizations and therefore 
making hierarchical mechanisms more suitable(Van 
de Vrande, Lemmens, & Vanhaverbeke, 2006; Van 
de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009).  
 
4.2.1.4 Task complexity  
The complexity of a task is described as the distinct 
specialized inputs needed to complete a product or 
service(Jones et al., 1997). It requires more 
coordination and creates behavioural 
interdependence between the organizations. By use 
of mutual adjustment between participants, through 
information flows and meetings, these difficulties 
can be overcome. The network governance form 
stimulates this behaviour and is likely to be preferred 
over other governance methods. 
 
4.2.2. CHOICE OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
4.2.2.1 Hierarchy and authority  
The classic dimensions from TCE are hierarchy and 
markets being mutually exclusive in its original form. 
Market failure justifies the need to organize activities 
internal to the firm based on the hierarchical 
mechanism of authority. Authority is viewed as the 
degree to which an organization can impact the  
decision making process of another organization(De 
Reuver, 2009; de Reuver & Bouwman, 2012)The 
ability to exercise control is seen as the primary 
reason for hierarchical mechanisms to be more 
efficient than market mechanisms. This is reached 
with an employment relationship or contractual 
arrangement that provides decision-making authority 
in certain areas(Geyskens et al., 2006). Between 
organizations it is not an employment relationship  
but a difference in power that gives an organization 
the decision-making authority(De Reuver, 2009; de 
Reuver & Bouwman, 2012)..  
4.2.2.2 Markets and Contracts  
     “Contract-based governance” is the degree to 
which organizations cling  to legally binding 
agreements in their collective action(De Jong & Ja 
Klein Woolthuis, 2009; Dolfsma & Seo, 2013). 
Several types of contracts may govern activities 
between firms. Contracts may include different types 
of commitments, regarding financial aspects, internal 
management, monitoring, allocation of outcomes, 
intellectual property, external relations and conflict 
resolution(Blumberg, 2001). In markets it is contracts 
and prices that are used to organize collective action. 
Markets “are a spontaneous coordination mechanism 
that imparts rationality and consistency to the self-
interested actions of individuals and firms (W. 
Powell, 2003; W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). 
The market is open to new participants and is free of 
future commitments. It is the prices that determine 
the success of an exchange. The price is most often 
used as a strategy to drive for the best bargain(W. 
Powell, 2003; W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). 
The governance mechanisms of the market 
dimension are contracts and prices. They offer choice, 
flexibility, and opportunity, and are used as a device 
for fast and simple communication(W. W. Powell & 
DiMaggio, 2012). The assumption is that the market 
is more efficient than vertical integration due to 
competition(O. Williamson, 2005; O. E. Williamson, 
1979). Vertically integrated organizations can 
become bureaucratic and slow, and therefore 
increasing the transaction cost. However, certain 
exchange conditions can create market failure, 
making hierarchical or network governance 
mechanisms more efficient.  
Contractual based governance helps reduce the 
hazards in a partnership, because they provide an 
efficient safeguard against opportunism(O. 
Williamson, 2005; O. E. Williamson, 1979). This is 
achieved by placing limits to the actions of partners 
and enhancing monitoring(Hoetker & Mellewigt, 
2009). Furthermore, they facilitate the control of 
information shared between partners and set out the 
rules for the resolution of any dispute that might 
occur(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). They have, however, 
the difficulty that everything should be known 
beforehand a transaction, to allow the drafting of a 
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contract. In particular in high-technology 
environments with unknown outcomes of a 
development project, this is difficult to write 
down(Bradach & Eccles, 1989). The contract is used 
to draft up specification, conditions, and the price for 
which the exchange will take place. It involves the 
division of benefits and guarantees that are given 
upon delivery. It is dependent on local law and the 
assumption of fair competition.  De Jong and Ja 
Klein Woolthuis (2009)argue that contracts and trust 
can serve both as substitutes and complement each 
other, and need not be mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Stinchcombe (1986) noted that contracts 
may simulate hierarchical relations and thus also 
involve power. 
4.2.2.3 Networks and Trust 
  
 The boundaries of a firm in an economic context 
have blurred as they engage in collaboration that 
does not resemble market like transaction nor a 
hierarchical one. In a seminal work by powell, he 
argues that it is relational contracts that are 
increasingly becoming important in a transaction 
instead of formal contracts or bureaucratic structures. 
Accordingly, the relational contracts are 
characterized by informal social systems that help 
firms meet resources and functional needs from their 
network instead of from vertical integration or by the 
market(W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). Conflicts 
are resolved by reputational concerns instead of law 
enforcements and the means of communication are 
relational instead of by pricing. In markets a firm will 
try to bargain the best deal while in a network it will 
try to create indebtedness and reliance in the long run. 
The bureaucratic structure of hierarchies fosters 
efficient decision making and clear departmental 
boundaries. The strength of hierarchies is in 
reliability and its accountability for efficiently 
exploiting activities. But when uncertainty disturbs 
the environment, the liabilities of hierarchies are 
exposed(W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 2012).  
The governance mechanisms of the network 
dimension, also referred to as relational 
mechanisms(Geyskens et al., 2006), are based on the 
trust in a relationship that each party will live up to 
the requirements.. 
 Reputation, goodwill, and referrals are important 
drivers that help build up trust between the 
organizations. The basic assumption of a network of 
relationships is that, one party is dependent on 
resources of another and that pooling of these 
resources can lead to gains. They put in effort to 
build up a relationship and over time it becomes 
economically sensible to exercise voice rather than 
exit(W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). Voice 
further stimulates the creation of friendship, 
reputation, and interdependence, integral parts of the 
relationship. Information from friends, or someone 
you have dealt with in the past and has proven 
reliable, is often more valuable than from strangers. 
The information that flows through networks is 
therefore more ‘thicker’ than information from 
markets, and ‘freer’ than that from hierarchies. This 
makes networks in particular useful for the exchange 
of commodities whose value cannot easily be 
measured(W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 2012), such as 
with innovations or uncertainty in the technology. 
Powell concludes that network mechanisms are in 
particular useful for collective action. In which 
cooperation can be sustained over the long run as an 
effective arrangement. The relationships in this 
cooperation create incentives for learning and the 
dissemination of information. This will improve the 
speed of translating ideas into action. With variable 
resources and high environmental uncertainty, 
networks are most useful because they offer feasible 
means of using and improving tacit knowledge and 
technological innovation(W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 
2012). 
The dominant governance mechanism in the 
dimension of networks is trust. It is often considered 
a multidimensional concept. Trust ‘the readiness to 
acknowledge vulnerability in light of positive 
assumptions about another's expectations or 
behaviours”(McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; 
McEvily et al., 2017; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & 
Milanov, 2010; Zaheer & Kamal, 2011).  
 To comprehend network level associations, it is the 
distribution of trust that is basic, and in the event that 
it is responded among the network members, it can 
be generally distributed (high thickness of trust 
relations), or barely distributed (low thickness of 
trust in relations). 
A distinction is made between interpersonal and 
institutional trust. Interpersonal trust relates to the 
trust that is obtained directly from individuals or 
groups. Where as institutional trust is experienced or 
observed indirectly by work or observing quality of 
institutions.  
Interpersonal trust can be viewed as a processed-
based trust that depends on a personal relationship 
between two firms and is hence exceedingly 
particularistic. Strong ties will be ties that are 
sincerely extraordinary and strong, encourage 
mobilization of assets or resources and are marked by 
elevated amounts of interpersonal trust. The level of 
trust diminishes as we move from strong 
interpersonal ties with our family to unknown ties 
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with outsiders, individuals in the city, and so forth.. 
Solid or strong ties tent to exist in network structures 
that are described by a high level of closure or 
network density, which allow for the exercise of 
reinforcement of positive expectations by means of 
close monitoring and social control  (Rus & Iglič, 
2005).   
Mutual trust between organizations, or inter-
institutional trust, can be seen as the reliability that 
the other organization will fulfil its obligations. Trust 
creates the expectation that the organizations will 
show predictable behaviour according to the 
agreement. The expectations in this case reduce 
transaction costs, because monitoring and 
renegotiating the exchange are needed when 
environmental changes occur. This is usually the case 
in highly complex tasks that face serious time 
constraints(Jones et al., 1997). Furthermore, it is 
believed that trust affects the richness and depth of 
exchange relations, especially concerning exchange 
of information. Trusting behaviour is noted as a core 
element for improving innovation through 
collaboration(Häusler, Hohn, & Lütz, 1994).  
 
5.0.   CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH. 
 
      The way a relationship is governed affects the 
functioning of the organisations involved. Proper 
governance can increase the health and prosperity 
(performance) of the organisations. Appropriate 
decision making is an important part of the inter-
organisational relationship governance. Therefore, 
the study tried to deepen the understanding of 
governance mechanisms that can be used by actors in 
a business network from the perspective of a business 
ecosystem. It tried analysing business relationships 
and identifies the mechanisms that are used in a 
relationship at a system level. An adequate 
knowledge in this by transactors can be useful in 
crafting strategies to predict each transactors 
behaviour in the transaction, and can as well help 
organizations optimize the value they extract from 
relationships. Secondly, research from this tangent is 
scarce, and therefore the research adds to previous 
contributions of (Holzer & Ondrus, 2011; Pittino & 
Mazzurana, 2013; Roshan Kokabha, 2012; Selander, 
Henfridsson, & Svahn, 2013) because it offers 
insight into the governance mechanisms that are 
exerted in relationships actors have in a business 
ecosystem.  
Also, the mechanisms identified in literature give 
room for further in-depth studies to identify the 
dynamisms of the governance mechanisms and how 
they can be used to influence relationships. With this, 
actors can use it to predict behaviour and craft 
strategies for their relationships. Sound knowledge in 
this can as well be used to influence the outcome of 
their relationship and sometimes may create the 
opportunity to exert governance on a system level.    
It is noted in literature that pluralism in governance 
mechanisms exist and these governance mechanisms 
are non-mutually exclusive in a governance 
dimension (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; de Reuver & 
Bouwman, 2012; Von Tunzelmann, 2003) .Therefore, 
in a governance dimension, a balance is sought for 
the governance mechanisms that can be exerted. 
With a sound knowledge of this balance, research 
can be performed to craft strategies for appropriate 
balances in partnership. For instance, in a formal 
relationship with transaction partners where a 
contract is used, the trust-based governance 
mechanisms can be used to give hope  that the 
organizations will live up to the obligations in the 
contract. Furthermore, an authority-based mechanism 
is used in the decision making process of the 
collaboration.  
      The study is however, limited in it completeness. 
Literature could not be reviewed on the application 
of game theory in relationship governance. This 
therefore, made it difficult to conclude that 
behaviours of transactors in relationships could 
possibly be predicted. Again, an attempt is made to 
suggest that transaction attributes greatly predict 
governance mechanisms and are influenced by 
business ecosystem dimensions on a network level. 
However, there can be other attributes such as 
structural properties of a network (Uzzi, 1997)  
innovation phases(de Reuver & Bouwman, 2012)  
that can influence governance mechanisms. For 
future research studies, the consideration of other 
factors together with transaction attributes applied on 
system level aspects will offer a comprehensive 
insight into relationship governance and the extent of 
influence that transactors can possess in the 
relationship. Also, the study could not identify the 
extent of influence the choice of governance 
mechanisms have on the performance of 
organizations. This is partly due to the nature of 
research studies reviewed, because larger portion of 
studies reviewed adopted qualitative approaches and 
hence difficulty in operationalizing the measurement 
metrics. 
      On the other hand, a sound knowledge on 
governance mechanisms will help practitioners to 
evaluate the relational risks associated with the 
transaction with another organization. If significant 
variations are noticed in how the transactors in the 
relationship prefer to exert governance mechanisms, 
a clue to possible manifestation of transaction 
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challenges could be identified in the relationship. For 
instance, a transactor that prefers working with 
contracts and is suddenly faced with a partner or 
transactor that lacks the skills to draft a contract can 
be influenced to exhibit opportunistic behaviour. To 
safeguard this relationship, the transactor or business 
partner must compensate the lack of contract-based 
governance mechanisms with a strong trust bond in 
the transaction exchange. 
      The academia can enrich the understanding of the 
governance mechanisms in relationship with actors in 
a business ecosystem when theories such as the game 
theory are used to give insight into the prediction of 
transactors behaviours in the relationship transaction. 
This can be used to design strategies for the 
participation of organizations in a business 
ecosystem. Therefore, more predictors of governance 
mechanisms in a relationship other than transaction 
attributes or exchanges are required. This can further 
provide room for research on the dynamics of 
governance mechanisms. 
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